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 Summary 
 
Control and liability: a triptych on the liabilities of de facto policymakers of 
companies   
 
This thesis focuses on the de facto control of Dutch companies. After a 
general introduction (chapter 1) and an explanation of the organisation of 
companies (chapter 2), the author first discusses the role of management 
board members of private limited companies and the degree of their 
autonomy (chapter 3). Next, three types of liability related to the de facto 
control of companies are discussed. The first is the position of actual (co-) 
policymakers. In the first part of this chapter the author discusses special 
statutory provisions in which (co-)policymakers are equated, in terms of 
liability, with formal directors under the articles. The second part of this 
chapter includes a study of the liability of (co-)policymakers based on 
general liability law (chapter 4). The following chapter is also divided into 
two parts and deals with the Dutch doctrines of piercing the corporate veil. 
The author first advocates the doctrine of identification in this regard, after 
which the author discusses the so-called indirect form of piercing the 
corporate veil from the perspective of groups of companies (chapter 5). The 
last part of the triptych deals with the liability of limited partners 
(commanditaire vennoten) under Dutch law. To this end, the author first 
discusses the current position of limited partners and then discusses 
proposals to amend the current statutory rules (chapter 6). His conclusion 
(chapter 7) includes both a contemplation of the triptych and a 
representation of parallels and contradictions discovered between the three 
forms of liability for the actual control of companies. 
 Introduction 
 
The starting point of this research is the autonomy of companies as 
participants in the legal system on the one hand, and the protection from 
liability for the persons controlling and owning companies on the other. 
Under Dutch law, directors of legal entities are in principle protected against 
liability because their actions are attributed to the company, while the 
liability of shareholders is by statutory law limited to their contribution. In 
the case of a limited partnership, the limited partner enjoys the same 
limitation of liability, but its managing partners have less protection against 
liability than the directors of legal persons. They are jointly and severally 
liable. The limitation of liability is justified by a separation of powers and 
stimulates the entrepreneurial climate. The nexus between policy-making 
and liability is reflected in different regimes in which, in order to prevent 
abuse of legal persons, acting as a director is threatened with liability. This 
forms the common denominator of the three parts of the triptych discussed 
in this thesis: liability of the (co-)policymaker, identification and liability in 
group relationships and the liability of limited partners resulting from 
Pagina 390 van 455 
 
violation of the prohibition for this partner to be involved in the 
management of the company. 
 Legal personality and liability 
 
For most legal entities, the aforementioned separation of powers is put in 
place by a formal distinction between onwnership and control. This 
distinction is related to the fact that a legal entity is unable to act by itself. 
Actually participating in a legal system requires the help of people. 
Company law makes sure that legal persons can participate in legal 
transactions through natural persons by assigning tasks, responsibilities and 
powers to the various bodies. The separation of ownership and control can 
be traced back to companies with a multitude of shareholders, where 
efficiency demanded that management be outsourced to a separate body. For 
that reason, the management of the company as well as its participation in 
the legal system have been assigned to the board of directors. In order to 
maintain control of their investment, the shareholders jointly have the power 
to directly or indirectly influence the company's policy, whereas the board 
of directors is tasked with protecting the interests of all those involved with 
the company. In this way shareholders retain a say in the company and the 
board of directors is required to ensure a balanced representation of the 
interests of both shareholders and other persons involved, such as 
employees and creditors. 
 
In the absence of this dichotomy, the effective representation of interests 
may be jeopardised. This is undesirable, since the limitation of liability 
encourages risk-taking and, therefore, the interests of others than the 
shareholder are in need of protection. The justification for the limitation of 
liability is blurred in the absence of the aforementioned dichotomy. An 
autonomous board of directors is, in principle, capable of ensuring that not 
only the interests of shareholders are served, but also the interests of others 
involved in the company. The two-tier structure provides for a balanced 
distribution of powers in order to ensure that the plurality of interests can be 
represented in a proportionate manner and requires the natural persons 
acting on behalf of the company to use their powers in a responsible 
manner. 
 
However, this does not automatically encourage directors to protect the 
interests of others involved with the company. The legal personality granted 
to companies offers directors protection against liability. Director's liability 
aims to create further protection of interests by sanctioning mismanagement 
with an obligation to pay compensation for incurred damages. When 
assessing the liability of directors, shareholders or limited partners, it is 
always relevant to what extent there has been control over the damaging 
action, or at least the possibility of preventing the particular action that led 
to the damage. This indicates an awareness of the personal responsibility of 
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natural persons who participate in legal transactions under the protection of 
legal personality or limited liability. Statutory rules on liability in relation to 
the de facto management of companies are intended to express this 
responsibility by providing de facto management with a normative and 
compensating framework. 
 Management  
 
This chapter discusses the role and powers of the management board, the 
possibilities for the management board to represent the company and the 
degree of autonomy of the management board.   
8.3.1 Role and powers  
 
Pursuant to section 2:239 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC), the 
management board of a private limited company (besloten vennootschap) is 
tasked with managing the company. However, statutory law does not 
provide for an elaborate description of management as such. It is therefore 
hard to define the scope of this task. The primary function of directors is 
that of being a manager. In summary, this includes the day-to-day 
management of the company and its business, as well as determining its 
strategy and policy for both the short and long term, taking into account the 
company's objects stated in the articles of association. In addition to 
preparing, adopting and implementing this policy, the management board 
also manages the company's assets and acts as an initiator for other bodies 
of the company. The role and duties of directors depend on, among other 
things, the nature and size of the business, the objectives of the company 
and the further allocation of duties and powers within the company's own 
organisational rules. Each director is required to perform his or her duties 
properly and to act in accordance with the interests of the company and its 
business. Under Dutch law, this interest extends beyond the interests of the 
shareholders and includes the interests of employees and creditors, among 
others. In addition, directors are tasked with controlling distributions to 
shareholders. Finally, as manager of the company and its assets, a director 
must also render the necessary account for, and provide information to, 
other stakeholders, such as shareholders and, in the event of the company's 
bankruptcy, the trustee in bankruptcy. The role of directors is not only 
formed by statutory law, but also by the articles of association of the 
company and resolutions of the company's bodies. The powers of directors 
may be extended or limited, but the directors must always retain a certain 
degree of autonomy. 
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8.3.2 Representation 
 
The company's participation in legal transactions results in particular from 
the performance of legal acts by its directors on behalf of the company. 
Directors derive their power to represent the company from statutory law 
(for directors of private limited companies enshrined in section 2:240 DCC). 
The authority to represent the company is always unrestricted and 
unconditional and may also be granted to persons other than directors. 
However, the authority of individual directors can be limited. Internal and 
organisational rules of the company cannot affect this authority. If the 
company is duly represented, the legal act on its behalf is attributed to the 
company. The statutory rules on the representation of companies are, again, 
based on the principle of protection of third parties.   
 
In addition to this statutory power of representation, the company may also 
be duly represented pursuant to statutory rules on the granting of a power of 
attorney. Not only directors, but also others can represent the company on 
the basis of a power of attorney. The scope of a power of attorney may be 
limited and is also subject to the powers imposed on the principal. A power 
of attorney may be embedded in a certain legal relationship, an appointment 
or position and may arise from the appearance of authority to represent the 
company. Finally, statutory law provides for liability of the person who 
claims to act by virtue of a power of attorney. In the absence of an adequate 
power of attorney, the other party can hold that person liable. 
8.3.3 Autonomy of the board of directors 
 
In the last part of this third chapter, the author considers the autonomy of the 
board of directors by discussing the authority of other bodies of the 
company to issue binding or non-binding instructions to the directors of the 
company. Since 2012, the articles of association of a private limited 
company may provide that the board is obliged to follow instructions from 
the corporate body or bodies referred to in such a provision, unless 
complying with this instruction would be contrary to the interests of the 
company and its business (section 2:239 paragraph 4 DCC). This 
authorisation to issue instructions must be distinguished from the de facto 
power of instruction arising from the power to suspend and dismiss directors 
of the company. In the legal doctrine, the statutory power of instruction has 
developed from the perspective of group companies. From this perspective 
the requirement of central management of a group already implies that the 
autonomy of directors of subordinated companies is limited. However, over 
the years a more nuanced view was adopted in case law in which judges 
considered the balancing of interests, including the interests of subsidiaries 
in relation to the interest of the group as a whole. At present, the power of 
instruction in a private limited company is designed in such a way that each 
instruction is assessed in relation to the company's and its business' interests. 
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As a result, the board is required to check each instruction to these interests 
and, depending on the outcome of such a check, may refuse to comply with 
an instruction. The author argues that another body of the company cannot 
give binding instructions to directors. The scope of the power of instruction 
is then discussed. In addition to a list of the bodies to which this authority 
can be granted, the author notes the general limitations of the authority to 
issue instructions. For example, in the articles of association of the 
company, the power of instruction may be limited by referring to specific 
subjects, while the company's interests may also indirectly lead to a 
limitation of the power of instruction. Finally, the standards for assessing 
both instructions and refusals to comply are discussed. At the end of this 
chapter, the author argues that judges must substantively exameninstructions 
to directors and their refusal to comply. 
 Liability of de facto (co-)policymakers 
 
In the fourth chapter, the author assesses the liability of (co-)policymakers. 
In doing so, the author distinguishes between liability arising from special 
statutory provisions that provide for the assimilation of (co-)policymakers 
with directors on the one hand ('actual policymakers') and liability based on 
the doctrine of tort, which does not provide for the aforementioned 
assimilation, on the other hand (false(co-)policymakers'). 
8.4.1 Actual (co-)policymakers 
 
In order to define the (co-)policymaking figure, the author first discusses the 
parliamentary history of the provisions that provide for the assimilation of 
(co-)policymakers with directors. To tackle the abuse of legal entities, the 
(co-)policymaker was introduced into statutory law in the 1980s. The 
legislator's main objective was to prevent directors of legal entities from 
escaping liability by allowing straw men to act as directors in their place. 
Since liability for mismanagement was linked to this formal capacity, it was 
necessary to provide for provisions that effectively equated  
(co-)policymakers with directors. It is important to note that the legislator 
never intended a broad scope for the liability of (co-)policymakers. 
Moreover, only the (co-)policymaker who actually acted as if he or she were 
a director may be held liable. This requirement makes it clear that the 
liability for (co-)policymaking is limited to cases in which corporate powers 
(f.e. shareholders or supervisory board members) or contractual powers (f.e. 
employees or advisors) are exceeded. In principle, all responsibility rests 
with the directors, but the person who, by exceeding his or her authority, co-
manages the company along with the directors or even sets the directors 
aside, may be liable in the same way as a director of the company. 
 
In order to qualify the (co-)policymaker, it is important to consider the  
anti-abuse background that played a role in the introduction of this figure. In 
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particular, one should think of cases which reveal an intention to avoid 
liability for prejudice to creditors by hiding behind the legal personality of a 
company. In order for a person not formally appointed as a director to be 
assimilated as such, it is necessary that he or she determined or co-
determined the company's policy, whereas in doing so he or she acted as if 
he or she were a director. For this qualification it is sufficient that this 
person co-managed the company. Finally, in principle, there must always be 
an active involvement of the (co-)policymaker in the damaging act.  
 
Pursuant to sections 36 of the Collection of State Taxes Act 1990 (CSTA) 
and 23 Sectoral Pension Fund (Obligatory Membership) Act 2000 (SPF), 
directors of entities (a broader context than just legal persons) are jointly 
and severally liable for certain tax debts and pension premiums respectively, 
if they do not timely notify the tax authority or pension provider that these 
debts cannot be paid (notification of inability to pay). They may also be 
liable if the notification obligation has been met but the debts remain unpaid 
and it is plausible that the non-payment of these debts is the result of 
mismanagement attributable to the directors. An explanation of the law on 
this subject is followed by three caveats in relation to the (co-)policymaker. 
Firstly, a failure to correctly or timely notify the authority of the inability to 
pay leads in principle to liability. The author argues that this presumption 
that leads to liability, without actually determining whether it is a case of 
mismanagement, should not apply if it appears from the circumstances that 
the (co-)policymaker was not able to comply with the notification obligation 
because he or she was not authorised to do so. Secondly, the collective 
nature of these provisions means that directors cannot disculpate by 
referring to the (co-)policymaker, since the directors always have their own 
responsibility. However, the mere circumstance that (co-)policymaking has 
taken place cannot solely lead to liability. Thirdly, the possibilities for 
equation in section 36 CSTA and section 23 SPF respectively influence each 
other. Consequently, in applying these provisions, a legal  
entity-(co-)policymaker1718 and its possible (co-)policymakers may also be 
held liable. The corporate law equivalent which provides for the liability of 
legal entity-directors (section 2:11 DCC) lacks such an effect. The referral 
in that provision is limited to the formal directors of legal entity-directors. 
 
Pursuant to section 2:248 DCC each director is jointly and severally liable 
for the deficit in a bankruptcy of the company in case of mismanagement 
and when it is plausible that this mismanagement is a major cause of the 
bankruptcy. Policymakers share this fate. After a general explanation of 
these rules, the author once again makes several caveats in relation to the 
(co-)policymaker. First of all, the circumstance that on the basis of section 
2:248 DCC, second paragraph, in the event of a violation of the obligation 
 
1718 Under Dutch law directors can either be natural persons or legal entities. 
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to keep records (section 2:10 DCC) or a violation of the obligation to 
publish the annual accounts (section 2:394 DCC), liability is in principle 
established. This principle also applies with respect to (co-)policymakers, 
although they do not necessarily have the powers required for the proper 
performance of their duties, including the power to involve themselves in 
the administration of the company or the annual accounts. The author argues 
that the Supreme Court has wrongly assumed responsibility for  
(co-)policymakers with respect to the duty of administration and the duty to 
publish. Secondly, it is doubtful whether the (co-)policymaker can 
effectively invoke the disculpatory powers of this provision. After all, the 
involvement of the (co-)policymaker in the mismanagement is often 
decisive in determining whether he or she can be regarded as a  
(co-)policymaker. Moreover, the (co-)policymaker may lack the ability to 
meet the requirements for an appeal to disculpation, since he is not formally 
authorised to oppose mismanagement of the directors or to take measures to 
avert the consequences thereof. In addition, the (co-)policymaker does not 
always realise that he or she qualifies as such and should therefore act 
disculpatory in anticipation of liability. For that reason, the author argues 
that when assessing an appeal to disculpation, account must be taken of 
circumstances that necessitate the conclusion that a policymaker did not 
have the ability or means to intervene and take action to limit the damage. 
 
Supervisory board members may also be held liable as (co-)policymakers 
(section 2:248 paragraph 1 jo. 7 DCC), while the law also provides for the 
liability of de facto supervisory board members (section 2:249 jo. 2:248 
paragraph 1 jo. 7 DCC). The author discusses the scarce case law in which 
such examples have arisen and concludes that supervisory board members, 
despite the fact that they may have a very strong influence or considerable 
degree of control over the company's policy, will normally act within the 
limits of their legal authority, so that they only have to fear liability as a 
director in very exceptional cases.  
 
The first part of this fourth chapter concludes with a discussion of sections 
2:207 (repurchase of own shares), 2:208 (resolution to reduce capital) and 
2:216 (dividend payment) DCC. The common denominator of these 
provisions is that the directors must give their approval when any kind of 
distribution is made to the shareholders. This approval must be refused if the 
directors know or should reasonably foresee that the company will not be 
able to continue to pay its due debts at a later date. The author first discusses 
the circumstance that these provisions relate to an internal liability (vis-à-vis 
the company), while the other provisions that provide for an assimilation of 
(co-)policymakers with formal directors relate to an external liability  
(vis-à-vis creditors). The author is critical of this mixture of internal and 
external liability. 
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8.4.2 False (co-)policymakers  
 
In the second part of this chapter, the author focuses his attention on the 
liability of (co-)policymakers on the basis of the general doctrine of tort 
(section 6:162 DCC). It starts with an explanation of the applicability of this 
provision to (co-)policymakers. Subsequently, the author considers whether 
this (co-)policymaker is the same as the one who can be held liable by virtue 
of an assimilation. He concludes that this is not the case and that the 
question of qualification in the application of section 6:162 DCC is not 
really necessary. The false policymaker distinguishes itself in the 
qualification question from the actual policymaker by the requirement 
typical of the latter, that he or she must have acted as if he or she were a 
director. In the light of section 6:162 DCC, the concept of the  
(co-)policymaker is erroneously assigned a functional meaning which leads 
to an unnecessary expansion of persons who can be held liable as a director 
on the grounds of a wrongful act. This is detrimental to the exceptional 
nature of the liability of this figure, as intended by the legislator. 
 
This qualification issue is followed by a critical explanation of the standard 
used in assessing the liability of false (co-)policymakers. Currently, this 
standard is equal to the standard that is used when assessing the liability of 
directors towards creditors of the company on the grounds of section 6:162 
DCC. This requires that serious blame can be attributed to the director 
personally. Because the common standard of section 6:162 DCC is 
exchanged for this special standard, a higher standard for liability applies to 
directors than outside cases of director's liability. The author argues that the 
justifications for accepting this higher threshold for liability do not apply to 
the (co-)policymaker. Consequently, this special standard cannot be applied 
in respect of the (co-)policymaker. Nevertheless, current case law shows 
that the liability of (co-)policymakers on the basis of section 6:162 DCC 
also requires that  serious blame can be attributed to the (co-)policymaker 
personally.    
 
Finally, the author discusses the application of section 2:11 DCC in the 
event of liability of (co-)policymakers pursuant to section 6:162 DCC. Since 
2017, it has been established that the transfer of liability from  
legal entity-directors to their directors applies to all cases in which directors 
are held liable in their capacity. However, according to the author, there is 
no room to apply section 2:11 DCC when the liability of a (co-)policymaker 
is based on section 6:162 DCC. After all, both sections of the law lack a 
provision that provides for an equation of the (co-)policymaker with 
directors. 
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 Piercing the corporate veil 
 
The fifth chapter deals with liability for the actual control of companies as a 
result of piercing the corporate veil. The first part deals with the doctrine of 
identification that is characterized as a direct form of piercing the veil. In 
such cases the principle that legal persons are equated with natural persons 
for property law purposes (section 2:5 DCC) is set aside. The second part of 
this chapter concerns an indirect form of piercing the veil, which leaves 
section 2:5 DCC intact but in fact achieves the same result. It is indirect, 
because the liability relates to obligations of the legal entity, but these are at 
the expense of the policymaker pursuant to section 6:162 DCC, because the 
policymaker personally committed a wrongful act against the creditor(s) of 
the legal entity. The author deals with this particular subject from the 
perspective of groups of companies, whereby a parent company is held 
liable for obligations of its subsidiary. 
8.5.1 Identification 
 
In cases of identification an exception is made to the principle of section 2:5 
DCC by assimilating two or more (legal) persons. Thereby, one legal 
subject is equated with one or more other legal subjects and is considered as 
one (under property law). The author first characterizes the protection that 
directors derive from this provision and the limitation of shareholders' 
liability as a privilege, and concludes that this protection or limitation of 
liability can be regarded as a socially accepted phenomenon based on the 
joint benefit to society as a result of economic prosperity. Subsequently, it is 
established that legal personality and the limitation of liability preclude that 
those who act consciously, or who at least should reasonably have been 
aware of an damaging act, can be sued by the company's creditors, while the 
foreseeability of damage justifies looking beyond the company itself for 
liability. On the basis of the doctrine of identification, it can be determined 
when the aforementioned privilege must give way in favour of aggrieved 
creditors. Subsequently, the author discusses the case law in which the 
doctrine of identification has developed. It follows from this that the 
identification-cases and the abuse of legal personality in that regard are 
preferably tackled with the application of section 6:162 DCC, because in 
such cases the accusation to be made (frustrating of recourse) and the extent 
of the compensation obligation (assigning the underlying claim instead of 
compensating the damage as a result of frustrating recourse) often do not 
match up. 
 
Although the author is of the opinion that the doctrine of identification 
should in principle be applied with restraint, he nevertheless advocates a 
wider applicability of this doctrine as a means to compensate creditor's 
damages. Finally, the author puts forward several viewpoints that could give 
more substance to the doctrine of identification. These are, on the one hand, 
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derived from insights from case law and literature on misuse of power, sham 
actions and evasion of the law. On the other hand, the author refers to 
insights that can be derived from case law and literature on attributing actual 
acts and legal acts to legal persons, as well as the knowledge of officers of 
legal persons. It is concluded that the common denominator is always the 
perspective of the injured party and thus the extent to which the injured 
party has legitimately relied on the identity of its opposing party. 
8.5.2 The indirect form of piercing the corporate veil 
 
This doctrine has particularly developed in the case law on liability of 
parent companies. The author describes this development and observes that 
the (casuistic) case law on carelessness of parent companies is moving 
towards the acceptance of a duty of care on the part of the parent company 
towards creditors of its subsidiaries on the basis of the circumstances of the 
matter. In this respect, the factors (i) intensive involvement or control, (ii) 
insight into the subsidiary and (iii) the foreseeability of damages are 
particularly important. 
 
After this description, the author provides a general explanation of duties of 
care under Dutch law in order to be able to approach the aforementioned 
criteria from this general framework. The liability for breach of a duty of 
care implies that there has been a failure to comply with that duty. In group 
relationships, the liability of a parent company for breach of its duty of care 
is essentially based on the accusation that it has failed to act where action - 
in view of its insight into the subsidiary - was necessary and - in view of its 
control over the subsidiary - was possible. In the remainder of this 
paragraph, the author discusses the meaning of the duty of a parent company 
to exercise supervision over its subsidiaries ('group management duty') on 
the one hand and the intensive involvement of the parent company on the 
other hand in assessing its liability. 
 
In short, the group management duty means that (the management of) a 
parent company is obliged to perform its duties properly towards the entire 
group. The author argues that as a parent company's involvement in its 
subsidiary increases, as a rule its insight into the subsidiary will also 
increase, so that it will have to be guided to a greater extent by the interests 
of the subsidiary in question. Only when the parent company expresses this 
involvement by interfering with its subsidiary on the basis of its (de facto) 
control, will it also have to bear a certain degree of responsibility. This is 
due to the fact that in that case the parent company must be deemed to be 
aware of the interests of its subsidiary's creditors and at the same time has 
the opportunity to respect those interests. However, it is in particular the 
requirement of intensive involvement or control that deserves attention in 
the assessment of liability. Such a degree of involvement leads to insight 
into and control over the subsidiary on the basis of which a duty of care on 
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the part of the parent company can be present. At the same time, the degree 
of involvement determines whether and to what extent the parent company 
was able to intervene in the affairs of its subsidiary. The author advocates 
that if such a possibility to intervene is lacking, the parent company should 
not be liable to creditors of its subsidiary. 
 
This chapter ends with a study into the possibilities of addressing a parent 
company as a (co-)policymaker within the meaning of section 2:248 
paragraph 7 DCC. To this end, the author first raises the qualification 
question: when can a parent company be considered a (co-)policymaker of 
its subsidiary? The de facto (corporate) powers used to control subsidiaries 
and to (co-)determine their policies are relevant for answering this question. 
Neither the single fact that the parent company is a (majority) shareholder 
nor the existence of a group management duty is sufficient to addres the 
parent company as a (co-)policymaker pursuant to section 2:248 paragraph 
7 DCC. The requirement that the parent company must have acted as if it 
were a director of its subsidiary implies that the parent company can only be 
regarded as a (co-)policymaker if it has stepped outside its role as 'central 
manager' of the group and the subsidiary's directors tolerate this or are set 
aside by the parent company. In addition, the parent company must have 
been managing the day-to-day affairs of the subsidiary directly by means of 
its de facto powers. Finally, the liability as (co-)policymaker is compared to 
the liability of parent companies on the basis of section 6:162 DCC (indirect 
form of piercing the veil). The author concludes that both forms of liability 
differ from each other, since in the case of (co-)policymaking it is 
particularly relevant in what way the parent company has interfered in the 
management of the subsidiary, whereas the indirect form of piercing the 
corporate veil requires a determination of the interference of the parent 
company with the policy of the subsidiary. After establishing this 
interference, an assessment must be made to what extent the parent 
company's insight into and (de facto) control over the subsidiary have been 
acquired as a result of such interference. 
 The liability of limited partners 
 
The sixth chapter is the third and final part of the triptych on the actual 
control of companies. It focuses on the liability of the limited partner. 
Unlike the general partners of a limited partnership, the limited partner is 
not liable for the debts of the company and does not share in its losses above 
the amount of its contribution. Pursuant to section 20 of the Commercial 
Code (CC), the limited partner may not, among other things, get involved 
with the management of the company (the 'management prohibition'). In the 
event of a violation of this prohibition, the limited partner is jointly and 
severally liable for the company's debts on the basis of section 21 CC and 
thus loses the privilege of limited liability. The author considers the 
background and scope of this management prohibition as well as the current 
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criteria for assessing the liability of a limited partner. In addition, the author 
compares the liability of the limited partner with that of the (co-
)policymaker within the meaning of section 2:248 paragraph 7 DCC. At the 
end of this chapter, proposals for amendments to the current legislation on, 
among other things, the liability of limited partners are discussed. 
 
The author argues that, in principle, the limited partner will have to be 
involved in matters that cannot be included in the day-to-day management 
of the company, so that the determination of the strategy of the limited 
partnership also falls within the competence of all partners jointly. 
Furthermore, the limited partner can indirectly influence the management of 
the limited partnership when certain decisions are subject to its approval or 
when the agreement of the partnership otherwise grants the authority to 
decide on internal matters. Finally, the limited partner is prohibited from 
representing the company. If the limited partner nevertheless acts in a 
representative capacity, this has two consequences: (i) the limited partner 
enters into the agreement with the other party instead of the company and 
(ii) the limited partner is jointly and severally liable for all obligations of the 
company. 
8.6.1 The management prohibition 
 
The management prohibition for limited partners is based on two principles. 
Firstly, it must be prevented that a limited partner abuses its privileged 
position resulting from limited liability by taking unacceptable risks when 
participating in legal transactions. Secondly, the management prohibition 
aims to prevent third parties from being misled by the limited partner. These 
third parties could easily mistake a limited partner for a general partner. 
Only the latter is jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the 
limited partnership. Keeping this background in mind, the author discusses 
the scope of the management prohibition. He observes that, currently, there 
are two main views on the scope of the management prohibition. The first, 
narrow interpretation of this scope limits the prohibited actions to purely 
external actions (i.e. towards third parties). Within the second, broader 
interpretation, the limited partner is completely forbidden to perform 
managerial acts, regardless of the involvement of third parties. In a more 
nuanced variant of this broad view it is assumed that internal acts of the 
limited partner are only prohibited in so far as these acts also have 
consequences for third parties. The author concludes that the limited partner 
is not entirely forbidden to be involved with the management of the 
company and in any case a certain degree of influence on the management is 
permitted internally. However, a dominant internal action of the limited 
partner must always lead to a violation of the management prohibition, 
insofar as this prohibition must (also) be considered as a provision aimed at 
preventing abuse and reckless actions under the protection of limited 
liability. 
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Until 2015, a violation of the management prohibition for the limited 
partner had far-reaching consequences. This was the result of the 
characterisation of section 21 CC as a penalty provision. According to the 
author, there was no reason to characterise the provision as such. However, 
it also offers the limited partner some protection, because a requirement of 
culpability is derived from this characterisation. The author concludes that 
liability also requires an active act on the part of the limited partner. Since 
2015, liability of the limited partner pursuant to section 21 CC is only 
justified if and to the extent that this liability is in accordance with the 
aforementioned background of the management prohibition. For this reason, 
its application may not be disproportionate to the nature and seriousness of 
the violation by the limited partner. Moreover, section 21 CC cannot be 
applied if and insofar as the sanction is not, or not fully, justified by the 
actions of the limited partner. In addition, judges may deviate from the 
principle that a limited partner becomes liable for all obligations of the 
company. Finally, it may now also be of importance whether third parties 
were aware that they were dealing with a limited partner instead of a general 
partner. The author provides the relevant case law with general commentary 
in this respect and, within this framework, further clarifies the notions of 
'disproportionality' and 'unjustified sanction'. With the framework for the 
liability of limited partners in mind, the author then considers whether the 
liability of limited partners is comparable to the liability of  
(co-)policymakers of legal persons. He does not consider this to be the case, 
because the relevant provisions differ too much from each other in design. 
This is despite the fact that both provisions partly share the same 
background and the fact that, since 2015, the assessment of the liability of 
limited partners shows similarities with the assessment of the liability of 
(co-)policymakers. There is, however, some convergence with regard to the 
nature of the relevant conduct: both the qualification as a (co-)policymaker 
and a violation of the management prohibition require an active action on 
the part of the (co-)policymaker and the limited partner respectively. 
8.6.2 Proposed amendments of statutory law 
 
In the last part of this chapter, the author discusses a private legislative 
initiative to reform the statutory law on partnerships proposed by the 
'Werkgroep Personenvennootschappen' (Working Group), as well as the 
preliminary draft by the official legislator for new statutory law on 
partnerships, which is based on the aforementioned initiative of the Working 
Group. 
 
In 2016, the Working Group presented a comprehensive proposal for new 
statutory law on partnerships. In this proposal, the limited partnership 
continued to exist as a separate legal form, including the limited liability of 
the limited partner. An important difference with the current provisions, 
however, is the proposal to allow limited partners to participate in the 
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management of the limited partnership or even form the management, 
excluding general partners. In principle, however, the limited partner would 
not be allowed to represent the limited partnership. In addition, the Working 
Group's proposal included a complete revision of the limited partner's 
liability. In line with the above, it was proposed to abolish the management 
prohibition and furthermore to allow the limited partner to represent the 
limited partnership on the basis of a power of attorney. On the other hand, a 
new provision for liability, inspired by section 2:248 DCC, would be 
introduced to prevent misuse of these newly acquired powers. In the 
proposal the limited partner is jointly and severally liable for the deficit in 
case of bankruptcy of the limited partnership, if its actions by virtue of a 
power of attorney are an important cause of the bankruptcy. The author is 
critical of the proposed provision, because the wording of the proposed legal 
text cannot lead to the intended legal consequences. Moreover, the provision 
is limited to legal acts only. Damaging acts that are not considered to be 
legal acts cannot be dealt with by applying the proposed provision, nor does 
it make any link with liability resulting from, for example, mismanagement. 
 
The legislator used the proposal by the Working Group as a basis for 
drawing up an official preliminary draft for new statutory law on 
partnerships. However, the legislator has chosen on the one hand to take 
provisions from the proposal of the Working Group and on the other hand to 
tinker with the text of these provisions, which does not improve the clarity 
of the official draft. Yet, the official preliminary draft does not affect the 
Working Party's proposal regarding the liability of limited partners acting by 
a power of attorney. The criticisms mentioned by the author on the proposal 
of the Working Group therefore apply equally to the official preliminary 
draft. In addition, the official preliminary draft is unclear about the extent to 
which limited partners can participate in the management of the limited 
partnership. 
  
